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Abstract 
This introductory article to the special issue on European Union, development policies and 
governance discusses how notions of (‘good’) governance came to dominate development 
discourses and policies since the mid-1990s. The article argues that governance was part of the so-
called Post-Washington Consensus, which understands governance reform as part of the creation of 
market societies. Despite the fact that academics have commonly emphasised that governance 
concerns the rules that regulate the public sphere, the dominant understanding of (good) governance 
in policy circles revolves around technical and managerial connotations. The second part of the 
article introduces some important features of EU development policy, and argues that this is 
essentially neo-liberal in nature and that it favours a technocratic approach to governance reform. 
The EU’s main instrument in relations with developing countries is the Country Strategy Paper, 
which includes a set of governance indicators for the assessment of the political situation in partner 
countries. In addition, the European Union has developed a ‘governance profile’, which consists of 
nine components. 
 
 
1. The Rise of Governance 
Since the mid-1990s, conceptions of governance have occupied a central place in 
development discourses and policies. Academically, the rise of the governance concept 
can be attributed, to an important extent, to the institutionalist wave that has swept across 
the social sciences.2 For the policy world, the emphasis of institutions and governance in 
the so-called new institutional economics, and the embrace of the latter by the World 
Bank, was highly relevant. Governance came to the rescue of neoliberal approaches to 
development, which were experiencing a crisis as a result of the failure of ‘market-
fundamentalist’ structural adjustment policies.3 
 The adoption of governance into the vocabulary of development has, in the words of 
some observers, been interpreted as a change from the market-based ‘Washington 
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Consensus’ to an institution-oriented ‘Post-Washington Consensus’. As famously argued 
by former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz,  
 
the policies advanced by the Washington Consensus are not complete, and they are 
sometimes misguided. Making markets work requires more than just low inflation; it 
requires sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies to facilitate the 
transfer of technology and to encourage transparency, to cite some fundamental issues 
neglected by the Washington Consensus.4  
 
The argument adopted by Stiglitz and others was that attention for governance and 
institutions had proven to be a necessary complement to the building or deepening of 
markets. Thus, it was argued, specific institutional frameworks are necessary 
counterweights to ‘market failure’. 
 The reasoning that the focus on governance represented a change away from market 
fundamentalism has been challenged by various scholars,5 who argue that the Post-
Washington Consensus is essentially neoliberal in character, as it continues to see the 
market as the preeminent, fundamentally benign force of development, and the state as 
being subject to the interest of rent-seeking actors. 
 One of the main implications of the adoption of the governance concept into the 
neoliberal development framework, which perceived governance in function of the 
building of markets, is that it came to be understood in predominantly technocratic terms. 
As the World Bank has stated it, ‘[t]he ability of the state to provide institutions that 
make markets more efficient is sometimes referred to as good governance’.6 Thus, ‘good 
governance’ seeks to ensure efficiency in public administration and public finance 
management, rule of law, decentralisation and regulation of corporate life, including 
competition laws and anti-corruption watchdogs, arms-length procurement processes and 
the outsourcing of public services and supply. Conceived as a form of authority outside 
politics and the traditional realm of administration, it is a means to claim autonomy for 
technocratic authority from what are seen as distributional coalitions. 
 ‘Good governance’ approaches of development agencies tend to take one of two 
forms. The first of these approaches has been taken by those agencies that interpret 
governance quality as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of development and associated 
aid instruments. This use of governance has its origins in the analyses of Burnside and 
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Dollar on aid effectiveness. According to these two World Bank analysts, development 
assistance would be effective only in countries that have adopted good governance and 
good policies.7 Various development agencies applied this logic since the late 1990s with 
the adoption of selectivity principles in aid allocation. For example, the World Bank 
implemented performance-based allocation to loans and grants given by its International 
Development Agency (IDA), while the United States adopted the Millennium Challenge 
Account.8 The European Union has moved in this direction to a certain extent with the 
adoption into the ACP framework of a ‘governance incentive tranche’, which should lead 
to allocations of aid funds on the basis of the governance situation and reform 
commitments in recipient countries.9 
 The second approach to ‘good governance’ has been applied by agencies that take the 
improvement of governance and the strengthening of institutions as the prime target of 
assistance policies. This position is located more squarely within dominant development 
policies, which see the building of (state) institutions as a major objective of foreign aid. 
As was the case with the first approach to governance highlighted above, these policies 
find support in the strategy advocated by the World Bank, that ‘[e]ffective aid supports 
institutional development and policy reforms that are at the heart of successful 
development’.10 The EU’s orientation to this approach can be found, among others, in the 
recent identification of issue areas where European Community aid was felt to have clear 
value added, and which mentioned ‘institutional capacity building’ as the sixth target.11 
 The dominant understanding of (good) governance in policy circles fails to recognise 
the essentially political character of governance issues, which relate to existing power 
relations in society and concern ‘the formation and stewardship of the formal and 
informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic 
and societal actors interact to make decisions’.12 Problems such as the access of 
marginalised groups to political decision-making or the attempts of powerful groups to 
manipulate governance reform to their advantage have generally received much less 
attention from the development agencies than public sector reform, public finance 
management and decentralisation, to mention but three popular issues.13 
 
2. Europe as a Development Actor 
 4
This special issue of the Third World Quarterly takes stock of the ways in which one of 
today’s most important development actors, the European Union,14 has implemented 
policies related to governance in its external development relations. The thrust of the 
argument presented in the following contributions is that EU development policies are 
essentially neo-liberal in character and that their governance-related strategies in effect 
display a technocratic orientation and are instrumental to deepening market-based reform 
in aid-receiving countries. 
 
2.1 EU Development Assistance 
In recent years, the European Union has become one of the major multilateral agencies in 
the field of development assistance. Not counting the aid flows originating from the EU 
member states, European development assistance increased to $ 11.6 billion in 2007, 
which amounted to over one-and-a-half times the aid provided by the World Bank 
through its IDA window in the same year.15 The three main objectives of EU 
development assistance, according to article 177 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, are: 
 
• the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries;  
• the smooth and gradual integration of these countries into the world economy; and  
• the campaign against poverty. 
 
EU development assistance policies are seen as ‘complementary’ to those of the member 
states. 
 The main target of EU development policies has traditionally been the group of 
member states’ former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (commonly 
referred to as ACP countries). After an initial period in which contacts with the former 
African colonies were regulated by the ‘Regime of Association’ (1957) and two Yaoundé 
Conventions (1963–1975), European relations with the ACP have been governed by four 
Lomé Conventions (1976–2000) and the Cotonou Agreement (since 2000), which 
included aid and trade instruments. Institutionally, support for the ACP countries has 
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been financed through the European Development Fund, which is replenished 
periodically by the EU member states. 
 Aid to the ACP countries has continued to account for a sizeable proportion of total 
EU development assistance. Since the coming into force of the Cotonou Agreement, aid 
to the ACP has increased from slightly under € 2 billion in 2001 to € 4.8 billion in 2008. 
ACP’s relative share in EU external assistance has remained more or less stable, at 35.4 
per cent in 2001 and 37.8 per cent in 2008. In 2005, member states pledged €22.7 billion 
to the European Development Fund, to be allocated to the ACP countries between 2007 
and 2013.16 
 
Table 1: Regional Distribution of Aid Commitments to Developing Countries (ODA), 
2004 and 2008 
 2004 2008 
 Allocation (in € 
million) 
Per cent of total 
allocation 
Allocation (in € 
million) 
Per cent of total 
allocation 
Europe 996 13.2 2,093 17.4 
Africa North of Sahara 480 6.4 546 4.5 
 South of Sahara 2,428 32.2 4,726 39.3 
 Regional 2 0.0 – – 
America North and Central 317 4.2 329 2.7 
 South  230 3.1 312 2.6 
 Regional 63 0.8 2 0.0 
Asia Middle East 398 5.3 735 6.1 
 South and Central 517 6.9 886 7.4 
 Far East 391 5.2 233 1.9 
 Regional 52 0.7 91 0.8 
Oceania 52 0.7 19 0.2 
Bilateral unallocated 1,172 15.5 1,677 14.0 
Multilateral 441 5.9 366 3.0 
Total  7,538 100.0 12,014 100.0 
Source: European Commission, Annual Report 2009 on the European Community’s Development and 
External Assistance Policies and their Implementation in 2008, SEC(2009)831 final, 30 June 2009, p 200. 
 
 
 Apart from its agreements with the ACP, the European Union has maintained relations 
with most other regions in the developing world. Assistance to non-ACP countries is not 
financed out of the EDF, but is included in the regular EU budget for development aid, 
usually referred to as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Particularly 
important is the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, which covers such diverse 
regions as the Middle East, North Africa and six former Soviet republics in Eastern 
Europe and the Caucasus. Table 1 shows that the EU’s external assistance has retained its 
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focus on these countries: aid to countries in the Middle East increased from 5.3 to 6.1 per 
cent between 2004 and 2008, while Eastern European countries saw their share grow 
from 13.2 to 17.4 per cent. The share of North African countries decreased in relative 
terms (from 6.4 in 2004 to 4.5 per cent in 2008), although the absolute amount of aid to 
this region grew by approximately 14 per cent. Aid to Asian countries (excluding the 
Middle East) fell in relative terms from 12.8 per cent of total European aid in 2004 to 
10.1 per cent in 2008. Although the EU has developed ideas on a partnership with Latin 
America, the share of EU aid flowing to countries in this part of the world has dropped 
from 8.1 per cent in 2004 to 5.3 per cent in 2008. 
 In terms of policy formulation, the European Council and European Commission have 
exhibited much activity in the area of development cooperation since the turn of the 
century, as evidenced by a joint statement on development policy issues in November 
2000. This declaration focused on poverty reduction as the ‘principal aim’ of the EU’s 
development policy and highlighted the need to ‘refocus’ its activities to a limited 
number of sectoral priorities in order to enhance impact. EU development assistance was 
argued to provide value added in the following six issue areas: 
 
• the link between trade and development;  
• regional integration and cooperation;  
• support for macro-economic policies and the promotion of equitable access to social 
services;  
• transport;  
• food security and sustainable rural development; and  
• institutional capacity building.17 
 
 Several years later, in December 2005, the European Council, Commission and 
Parliament agreed on another joint statement, labelled the ‘European Consensus on 
Development’ in a clear attempt to juxtapose it to the Washington Consensus dominated 
by the World Bank and the US government. The European Consensus was an attempt to 
formulate ‘for the first time, a common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at its 
Member States and Community levels, in development co-operation’.18 According to the 
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Consensus, ‘[t]he primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is 
the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)’.19 Several ‘common principles’ of 
European development cooperation were laid down; most notably, these were: ownership 
and partnership; the need for engaging in political dialogue with developing countries; 
the participation of civil society, including economic and social partners; the promotion 
of gender equality and women’s rights; and the attention for state fragility.20 Aid 
effectiveness would be enhanced, according to Council, Commission and Parliament, by 
concentrating development assistance on a limited number of activities where the EU 
would possess a ‘comparative advantage’. The activities that were singled out, were the 
following: 
 
• trade and regional integration; 
• the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; 
• infrastructure, communications and transport; 
• water and energy; 
• rural development, territorial planning, agriculture and food security; 
• governance, democracy, human rights and support for economic and institutional 
reforms; 
• conflict prevention and fragile states; 
• human development; and 
• social cohesion and employment.21 
 
2.2 EU Development Assistance and Governance 
The main tool in the relationship between the European Community and partner 
developing countries is the Country Strategy Paper. In line with the practice of many 
international development agencies, the European Community formulates a medium-term 
strategy for the provision of development assistance on the basis of a country’s official 
national policy priorities. Developing countries have usually laid down their priorities in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are required for getting support from 
the World Bank and IMF. According to the European Commission, the establishment of a 
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common framework for the formulation of CSPs makes ‘a significant contribution to 
achieving the goal of multiannual programming and to increasing the effectiveness and 
quality of the EU’s external aid’.22 
 As part of the ‘country diagnosis’, a Country Strategy Paper is required to contain an 
analysis of the political – along with the economic, social and environmental – situation 
in the partner country. An important set of governance indicators is included among the 
assessment of the political situation, such as: 
 
• the main obstacles at the national level for the protection of and respect for human 
rights; 
• the observance of democratic principles, as related to elections and change of 
government; 
• the organisation of the government and decision-making procedures, including the 
division of power over different levels of government, transparency and accountability 
of key political institutions, measures countering corruption and other forms of 
economic criminality, and the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; and 
• evidence pointing at state fragility, such as the incapacity to perform basic government 
functions (security, social services and human rights).23 
 
In addition to applying these indicators, the European Commission has argued that  
in fragile states, post-conflict countries and specific cases of countries that have yet to 
achieve ‘structural stability’ or are showing signs of increasing instability, greater 
attention should be given to analysing measures taken to ensure security and stability, 
including conflict prevention and management, post-conflict intervention strategies 
(demobilisation, disarmament, re-integration (in particular of women and child 
soldiers), rebuilding, humanitarian mine clearance, support for action against illegal 
arms trafficking and dissemination of small arms and light weapons, etc.), and the 
introduction of the rule of law and democracy (including broader participation of civil 
society and a more equitable distribution of power).24 
 Accompanying the Communication on ‘Governance in the European Consensus’, the 
European Commission published a methodology for assessing developing countries’  
governance quality. In the first instance the so-called ‘governance profile’ was developed 
for ACP countries, but later releases of the profile have dropped the reference to only the 
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ACP group. The profile was set up as a ‘programming tool’, the main objectives of which 
are ‘to help identifying specific areas of cooperation (weaknesses) and agreeing on 
benchmarks and targets for reform (Government commitments), or on sectoral 
performance indicators, if governance is a focal area’25. The governance profile was 
meant for application by the European Commission, and would not necessarily reflect a 
common understanding of governance quality in the recipient country: ‘The governance 
profile is not meant to be done necessarily jointly with the partner country but its content 
should be shared (but not negotiated and agreed) with partner country during the 
programming dialogue’.26 
 The governance profile developed by the European Commission consists of nine 
components, which are subdivided into a variety of specific issues. The profile is 
summarised in table 2. The governance profile as used by the European Commission 
draws heavily on the work done by staff at the World Bank Institute, resulting in the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.27 The first six components are based on the 
six elements of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The final three indicators (on 
social governance, international and regional context, and quality of partnership) have 
been developed by staff at the Commission. Of the nine components, two 
(political/democratic governance and internal and external security) seem to address 
political issues of governance most directly, while two (internal and external security, and 
international and regional context) appear to be most directly related to the problems 
faced by fragile states. Two components (political governance/rule of law and control of 
corruption) primarily assess the presence of legal instruments, while two (government 
effectiveness and economic governance) are essentially meant to scrutinise the 
management of economic policies and policy-making. The component on social 
governance relates to the implementation of a variety of social policies. The final 
component is geared to assessing the implementation of EU development projects and 
programmes. Also, the inclusion of an item on migration in the eighth component appears 
to be informed mainly by concerns in the European Union about possible immigration.28 
 
Table 2: The European Commission’s Governance Profile 
Components Items 
1. Political/democratic governance a. Human rights 
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    (WBI’s Voice and accountability) b. Fundamental freedoms 
 c. Electoral process 
 d. Principles of constitutional democracy 
2. Political governance/rule of law: 
    Judicial and law enforcement system 
 
3. Control of corruption  
4. Government effectiveness a. Institutional capacity 
 b. Public finance management 
5. Economic governance (WBI’s  a. Private sector/market-friendly policies 
    Regulatory quality) b. Management of natural resources 
6. Internal and external security (WBI’s a. Internal stability/conflict 
    Political stability and absence of violence) b. External threats and global security 
7. Social governance  
8. International and regional context a. Regional integration 
 b. Involvement in regional initiatives on governance 
    and peer-review mechanisms (such as APRM) 
 c. Migration 
9. Quality of partnership a. Political dialogue 
 b. Programming dialogue 
 c. Non-state actors 
Source: European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication ‘Governance 
in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized Approach within the European 
Union’, SEC(2006)1020, 30 August 2006, pp. 13-29. 
Note: WBI refers to the World Bank Institute’s Governance Matters indicators. 
 
3. Outline of this Special Issue 
The contributions to this special issue contest recent EU approaches to governance and 
development. As highlighted above, the articles are informed by the general 
understanding that the EU’s approach to development and governance is essentially neo-
liberal in character and reflects a technocratic, instrumental orientation premised on the 
need to deepen market-based reforms in the countries of the south. 
 The first article, by Maurizio Carbone, discusses the EU’s take on governance in the 
context of the development policies that have been implemented since the turn of the 
century. In particular, Carbone focuses on the attempt of the European Commission to 
harmonise the approach to governance, revolving around the idea of ‘democratic 
governance’. The article argues that the EU’s initiative seems to have been in line with 
the principles of aid effectiveness stemming from the Paris Declaration, but that 
implementation of the policy is lacking. Such ‘policy evaporation’ seems to be caused, to 
a significant extent, by the difficulty to achieve intra-EU coordination. A direct 
consequence of this appears to be a decrease of the leverage of developing countries in 
relation to the European Union. 
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Nikki Slocum-Bradley and Andrew Bradley, in their article, focus on the relationship 
with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America (ACP) since the adoption of 
the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Discussing various instruments that have been applied 
in EU-ACP relations, the authors assess to what extent these relations conform to the EU-
endorsed principles of ‘good governance’, and whether they seem to contribute to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction in the ACP countries. Slocum-Bradley 
and Bradley conclude that the governance rhetoric adopted by the European Union is 
contradicted, in a good number of cases, by the implementation of policies, and that EU 
instruments are not necessarily conducive to the development of ACP partners. 
In the third article, Ian Taylor discusses the relations between the European Union and 
Africa, more in particular the EU position on NEPAD and its governance aspirations. 
According to Taylor, Western support of NEPAD’s neo-liberal, technocratic agenda took 
insufficient account of the nature of the regimes in Africa and, more importantly, the 
political economy of rule in many countries of the continent. Thus, Western countries 
ended up supporting the personalised power structures of rulers who showed little or no 
commitment to the principles of good governance preached by the donors. Finally, the 
increased importance of China as a partner of African governments may make the EU’s 
emphasis of governance largely irrelevant, although Taylor points out that, in the longer 
run, China may be motivated by similar concerns about the governance of African 
countries as the European Union. 
David Chandler, in his article on the EU and Southeastern Europe, focuses on the 
impact that EU is having on the candidate member states in the region. According to 
Chandler, the EU is exercising considerable regulatory power over the countries of 
Southeastern Europe, based on essentially depoliticised and technocratic conceptions of 
management. The EU’s approach to the region, Chandler argues, is based on a ‘post-
liberal’ discourse of governance, which focuses on technical and administrative capacity 
rather than legitimacy. The EU, while couching its methods of rule in terms of 
partnership and ownership, is dominating the region by, among others,  Europeanising 
the candidate states’ governance institutions and attempting to create a policy-advocating 
civil society. The state institutions in the regions have consequently been bereft of their 
possibilities to engage with and represent social interests. 
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 In her article on EU relations with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, 
Katharina Hoffmann focuses on the claim that the recent EU partnership strategy for the 
region is aimed at the promotion of good governance. Building on the literature on 
external democracy promotion, in particular, in relation to post-communist countries, 
Hoffmann argues that the regimes of the Central Asian countries have essentially 
remained authoritarian after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. She indicates that the 
regimes invariably have retained neopatrimonial features, such as personalised power and 
the monopolisation of resources by the regime. In such an environment, the promotion of 
good governance is not likely to be successful. Hoffmann explains the continued 
engagement of the European Union, despite the absence of progress in the area of 
governance and democratisation, with reference to the EU’s security and economic 
interests that revolve around the access to sources of energy (in particular, natural gas) 
and the concern about terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. 
 In the next article, Karim Knio discusses the EU’s strategy for the Mediterranean, and 
focuses on the discussion surrounding the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Development 
Bank (EMDB) for the countries in the region. The article revolves around the polarity in 
the literature on governance and institutions. According to Knio, there is a stark contrast 
between the ‘techno-managerial’ position in the institutionalist literature, which can be 
considered to be ‘power insular’, and certain ‘power sensitive’ approaches, which focus 
on interests and power dynamics underlying certain governance arrangements. The two 
‘faces’ of governance are represented, Knio argues, in the debate about the Euro-
Mediterranean Development Bank. The first approach to the Bank emphasises the limited 
mandate and subordinate role of the EMDB to its parent institution, the European 
Investment Bank, allowing little influence by the Mediterranean countries. The second 
approach stresses the independence of the EMDB, and grants the countries of the region a 
say in its governance structure. Knio concludes that the technocratic approach of the 
European Union prevailed, thus leading to the maintenance of an institution that would 
primarily assist small- and medium-sized enterprises in the region. 
 Rosalba Icaza’s article addresses the neo-liberal nature of the European Union’s 
approach to Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the resistance to the regional 
project within the region’s civil society. Icaza argues that the strategic partnership for the 
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region on the side of the EU was driven primarily by the desire to liberalise trade and 
investment. In her view, market actors, most notably multinational companies, are seen as 
the key drivers of regionalism and development. This approach to regionalism is 
contrasted with approaches that emphasise resistance to neo-liberal regionalism and 
claims for ‘cognitive justice’. The latter approaches question the claims made for neo-
liberal modes of governance and aim at increasing the political visibility of forms of 
knowledge that would normally be ignored. Icaza’s article analyses the activities of the 
so-called Permanent People’s Tribunals against European Multinationals and Neo-
liberalism as attempts at questioning the violations of rights of Latin American people by 
European MNCs or their local subsidiaries. 
 The last research article of this special issue, by Wil Hout, focuses on the European 
Union’s approach to governance in failed states. Arguing that the EU’s fragile state 
agenda was spurred, in the first place, by the desire to address security issues in 
developing countries, the article emphasises that the EU, as most Western development 
agencies, has approached state fragility primarily in terms of a governance deficit. Hout 
analyses the governance-oriented measures that were adopted in the Country Strategy 
Papers (CSPs) that the European Commission has formulated in consultation with the 
governments of five so-called fragile states. He concludes that there is a substantial 
difference between the political analyses made in the CSPs and the policies adopted by 
the EU for reconstructing governance in fragile states, which consist mainly of 
technocratic measures. Issues of state capture, human rights and inequalities are generally 
left unaddressed in the EU’ approach. 
 Stephen Hurt’s review article discusses five recent books on EU development policy. 
Hurt focuses on four main themes in the books under review: the historical legacies, the 
global context, the increasing uniformity of the EU’s approach to different parts of the 
developing world, and the role of self-interest. Hurt emphasises the EU’s strategy of 
attempting to lock-in liberal capitalism to regional projects across the developing world. 
He also argues that, apart from ideological motives related to the emphasis of the 
Millennium Development Goals, self-interest has started to occupy a more important role 
in EU development policies in recent times. The difficulty in reconciling principles of 
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policy coherence with the EU’s approach to development and external relations, 
according to Hurt, is witness to this tension. 
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